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Makta Pond 13 minutes ago (edited)

GOOGLE / YOUTUBE FEEDBACK THIS PAGE [https://www.youtube.com/c/SBCountyHS/discussion]

DEAR GOOGLE / YOUTUBE FEEDBACK ----

MUSIC LINKS

Honesty By Billy Joel

http://google.computing-and-moral-responsibility.persuasive-technology.music.fuckeduphuman.net/Honesty/

Barbra Streisand Don't Lie To Me From Album Walls

http://google.computing-and-moral-responsibility.persuasive-technology.music.fuckeduphuman.net/Dont-Lie-To-Me/

THIS LINK ABOVE IS A MULTI-PART YOUTUBE VIDEO PLAYLIST AND THAT PLAYLIST MUST BE WATCHED AND RECEIVED --- BY CIVIL

SOCIETY IN RELATION TO THE QUOTATIONS HIGHLIGHTED REGARDING PERSUASIVE TECHNOLOGY HEREIN THESE COMMENTS.

Another week has gone --- and the matter to which the San Bernardino County Department of Behavioral Health and the Director Dr. Veronica

Kelley has once again gone by without them having any reasonable action on matters that are extremely imperative to form a civil society

discussion on several key factors as of the date of this projection of moral agency and moral responsibility for failure to act --- criminal acts of

negligence --- of nonfeasance in health-related matters that are addressed in a specific NIH.GOV [National Institutes Of Health] that is placed into

the [DISCUSSION] CONTENT that is being intentionally oppressed/suppressed because of the fault of the San Bernardino County history time

wide from my first interactions with their department with Dr. Christopher Eric Berger and Doctor Mirza and Therapist John Graves at the SB

County Mental Health Interface at the Phoenix Counseling Center.

http://webdomains.fuckeduphuman.net/dbh.sbcounty.gov/

http://fuckeduphuman.net/Terran-Imbalanced-Interpersonal-Relations/

http://gruwup.net/Terran-Imbalanced-Interpersonal-Relations/

From: Real Up Human [.net] <realuphuman.net@gmail.com>

Date: Sun, Mar 25, 2018 at 1:41 AM

Subject: Re: [Fair Use Right in Publishing] - Discrimination Case Against San Bernardino County - Re: I want to let you know that i have used one

of your Magnumstone images without permission for a Roger Waters [of Pink Floyd]

To: "Dr Christopher Eric Berger : @FuckedUpHuman.Net For Obvious Interference Bias" <cberger@wp.sbcounty.gov>

Cc: chris berger <cebergerllu@gmail.com>, SupervisorGonzales@sbcounty.gov

-----

https://npino.com/npi/1063679017-dr.-christopher-eric-berger/

https://npino.com/social-worker/1902211774-ms.-veronica-lynn-kelley/

https://npino.com/counselor/1932236510-mr.-bruce-david-cooke-sr./

https://npino.com/case-manager/1427613231-wendy-ann-holmquist/

https://npino.com/npi/1386606465-balbir-natt/

http://sir-mike-isocialcop-bires.fuckeduphuman.net/

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http://webdomains.fuckeduphuman.net/dbh.sbcounty.gov/TheHatersWin-AndNotMe-StateOfStandardsOfAbuseReceivedIn-

dbh.sbcounty.gov.mp3

http://webdomains.fuckeduphuman.net/dbh.sbcounty.gov/TheHatersHaveWon-WhyNotCommitSuicide-

TheseAreTheDocsInChargeOfMentalHealthInThisCountry.mp3

http://webdomains.fuckeduphuman.net/dbh.sbcounty.gov/TerminationOfServicesIsAnActOfDiscrimination.ogg

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About Standards [FUCKEDUPHUMAN.NET : FUCKEDUPHUMAN.LIFE : FUCKEDUPHUMAN.SPACE]:

http://chesneykleinjohnapartments.fuckeduphuman.net/Gmail-YouTube-%5B-Colorado-Outspoken-%5D-Why-Should-This-Not-Be-The-

Standard.htm

On the largest popular and most recognized social media networking site of "Linkedin", actual "in operation" company name profiles].contain the

word "fuck" in them. This to be a part of their actual "operating" business license, not just a dba.

Such examples include [but not limited to], "Fuck Cancer" at [https://www.linkedin.com/company/fuck-cancer/about/], "Fuck Yeah

Astrophysics" at: [https://www.linkedin.com/company/fuck-yeah-astrophysics-/about/], "Fuck Rasism" at: [

https://www.linkedin.com/company/fuck-rasism/about/],and "Fucked Up Design" at [

https://www.linkedin.com/company/fucked-up-design/about/].

Furthermore, each of these cited examples of companies above each having similarly existing web presence internet domains accessible

matching their namesake, [of course]. Such as "http://FuckCancer.org" and "http://FuckYeahAstrophysics.com, a non-profit example, and a

.com example.

With that standard established on that professional's site on LinkedIn is the most recognized, that takes this standard to then apply to the entire

web. [at least the English speaking and other [multitude] other languages across the globe that have the embedded meme of the meaning of

the word "fuck" in their culture. Given that this word is heavily embedded into the cultures of thje entire planet , to be one of the most embedded

words in general, that makes the use of the word very intrinsically meaningful when it is used. Do you agree with that argument as a foundation??

[Please provide an answer:_____ rather than deleting this comment due to some offense you are taking,.

Foundationally then, as an established standard does then apply to the word used of "fuck" in posts, dialogue, and business relations

correspondences is a standard that must be allowed. Any deviation by omission is censorship that does not express the meaning of the word

and there is no other replacement word that exists. As "Fuck" is more popularly used and commonly understood across multi-languages, it is the

best choice to use that any word that can be possibly ideally replaced as a word for "peace".

[** THAT STATEMENT IS UNCONDITIONALLY TRUE **]

Now with that justification used, the use of the word "fuck" in the linking web presence of "http://fuckeduphuman.net" meets this standard and

must be allowed to hold in any YouTube commenting onto any YouTube video to which there is a reasoning or relevant web presence that links

the video subject or it's appearing persons [this case Darrell Johnson] to the digital objects of our information society that just so happen to be

stored at the internet domain referenced here. You fail to understand that culturally understood standard, you need to remove this video from the

web so that the applied comments have no purpose to be posted and said. [at least here].

👍 👎   REPLY

Makta Pond 1 hour ago

GOOGLE/YOUTUBE FEEDBACK ON THIS PAGE -----

I would really take these FEEDBACK onto the page of

https://www.youtube.com/c/SBCountyHS/discussion

EXTREMELY SERIOUSLY!

http://fuckeduphuman.space/YouTube-SBCOUNTYHS/

IMAGES ATTACHED TO TWEETS OBVIOUSLY NOT INCLUDED IN THIS FEEDBACK COMMENT.... IT WOULD BE BEST TO READ THE TWEET

AND THREAD FROM TWITTER SERVED DATA PAGE.

https://twitter.com/APAHealthyMinds/status/1314976502849699846

Dr. Veronica Kelley Retweeted

APA Healthy Minds

@APAHealthyMinds

Level 1:

The shame and stigma surrounding mental health and addiction keeps far too many from seeking treatment they need. Today, on

#WorldMentalHealthDay, it is important to change the language and perception around mental health, let's #endthestigma. Visit

https://psychiatry.org/patients-families/stigma-and-discrimination.

10:10 AM · Oct 10, 2020·Hootsuite Inc.

46

 Retweets

3

 Quote Tweets

73

 Likes

Tweet your reply

The Science of Swearing - FUCK YOU ALL HATERS!

@Gruwup

.

Oct 11

Level 2:

I have DECLARED WAR - I am WILLING and ABLE to PROGRESS to a STEP that is UGLY and TRUE. ALL you have to understand is that I AM A

CITIZEN of SAN BERNARDINO holding an INFORMATIONAL NETWORK of PERSUSAVE TECHNOLOGY and COMPUTING and MORAL

RESPONSIBILITY - I HOLD MORAL AGENCY!

The Science of Swearing - FUCK YOU ALL HATERS!

@Gruwup

.

Oct 11

Level 3:

What EXACTLY is EVERYONE'S PROBLEM that DOES NOT ENGAGE a CITIZEN MY RIGHTS BUT DENIES MY RIGHTS --- BLOCKS ME ON SOCIAL

MEDIA BY PUBLIC AGENCIES --- ALL WRONG ACTIONS YOU ALL TAKE AGAINST THIS TRUTH FROM BEING TOLD AND EXPOSED!

http://doctor-veronica-kelley.fuckeduphuman.life/Mike-ISocialCop-Bires/Call-My-Bluff-TREASON-is-not-a-thing-to-sneeze-at-To-Mike-

iSocialCop-Bires.ogg

http://mike-isocialcop-bires.fuckeduphuman.life/Doctor-Veronica-Kelley/Trust-Ladder.png

The Science of Swearing - FUCK YOU ALL HATERS!

@Gruwup

.

Oct 11

Level 3:

ALL WE NEED TO DO -- IS UNDERSTAND -- WHAT I AM REPRESENTING TO YOU -- THERE ARE OUTSIDE RESOURCES HERE TO THE OPINIONS

EXPRESSED THAT ARE ARE WALKING ON DANGEROUS GROUND --- BY IGNORING ME AND DISMISSING ME AND THESE SUBJECTS.

Agenda 21 in a Nutshell | The KrisAnne Hall Show

Agenda 21 in a Nutshell July 2015 By KrisAnne Hall Subscribe, Like, Comment and Share Laying the groundwork for total transformation of

America has been in t...

youtube.com

The Science of Swearing - FUCK YOU ALL HATERS!

@Gruwup

.

Oct 11

Level 3:

https://youtube.com/watch?v=muY1QRAntlQ

The Transcript --- I will place this as a stipulation that you all are being conflicted avoidance --- a lie by omission.

YOU MUST COMPLY! TO REPLY AND ENGAGE A DISCUSSION ON BRINGING FORWARD THE NEEDS OF THIS COMMUNITY REGARDING

#STOPGANGSTALKING!

Conflict Avoidance and Associated Problems

Jordan Peterson touches on what I believe gives any relationship - partner, friend or work mate - a better chance of some longevity. Of course, this

same adv...

youtube.com

Dr Roy Kallivayalil

@RoyKallivayalil

.

Oct 10

Level 2:

Yes, statement is rampant and continues to be the biggest barrier for mental care. We must make every effort to confront this!

Sydur Rahman, MD (he him his)

@Sydur828

.

Oct 10

Level 2:

Hundred points symbol

Lukas Vögele

@VogeleLukas

.

Oct 13

Level 2:

The truth about your association and governmental #radiomindcontrol U.S. Patent 6,017,302

This patent describes how you can make people sleepy at 1/2 Hz and 2.5 Hz, trigger panic attacks, or make someone sexually aroused, sleepy

and confused!

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http://fuckeduphuman.life.mike-isocialcop-bires.community.gruwup.net/Computing-and-Moral-Responsibility/

Computing and Moral Responsibility

First published Wed Jul 18, 2012; substantive revision Fri Feb 16, 2018

Source: plato.standford.edu

Written Text

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computing-responsibility/

Audio Part 1 : Intro/Table Contents/1. Challenges to moral responsibility

http://fuckeduphuman.life.mike-isocialcop-bires.community.gruwup.net/Computing-and-Moral-Responsibility/Computing-and%20Moral-

Responsibility-Rev2018-Full-Part1.ogg

Audio Part 2 : 2. Can computers be moral agents?

http://fuckeduphuman.life.mike-isocialcop-bires.community.gruwup.net/Computing-and-Moral-Responsibility/Computing-and%20Moral-

Responsibility-Rev2018-Full-Part2.ogg

Audio Part 3 : 3. Rethinking the concept of moral responsibility / Conclusion/Credits

http://fuckeduphuman.life.mike-isocialcop-bires.community.gruwup.net/Computing-and-Moral-Responsibility/Computing-and%20Moral-

Responsibility-Rev2018-Full-Part3.ogg

Computing and Moral Responsibility

First published Wed Jul 18, 2012; substantive revision Fri Feb 16, 2018

Traditionally philosophical discussions on moral responsibility have focused on the human components in moral action. Accounts of how to ascribe moral responsibility usually describe human agents performing actions that have well-defined, direct consequences. In today's increasingly technological society, however, human activity cannot be properly understood without making reference to technological artifacts, which complicates the ascription of moral responsibility (Jonas 1984; Waelbers 2009).[1] As we interact with and through these artifacts, they affect the decisions that we make and how we make them (Latour 1992). They persuade, facilitate and enable particular human cognitive processes, actions or attitudes, while constraining, discouraging and inhibiting others. For instance, internet search engines prioritize and present information in a particular order, thereby influencing what internet users get to see. As Verbeek points out, such technological artifacts are "active mediators" that "actively co-shape people's being in the world: their perception and actions, experience and existence" (2006, p. 364). As active mediators, they change the character of human action and as a result it challenges conventional notions of moral responsibility (Jonas 1984; Johnson 2001).

Computing presents a particular case for understanding the role of technology in moral responsibility. As these technologies become a more integral part of daily activities, automate more decision-making processes and continue to transform the way people communicate and relate to each other, they further complicate the already problematic tasks of attributing moral responsibility. The growing pervasiveness of computer technologies in everyday life, the growing complexities of these technologies and the new possibilities that they provide raise new kinds of questions: who is responsible for the information published on the Internet? Who is responsible when a self-driving vehicle causes an accident? Who is accountable when electronic records are lost or when they contain errors? To what extent and for what period of time are developers of computer technologies accountable for untoward consequences of their products? And as computer technologies become more complex and behave increasingly autonomous can or should humans still be held responsible for the behavior of these technologies?

This entry will first look at the challenges that computing poses to conventional notions of moral responsibility. The discussion will then review

two different ways in which various authors have addressed these challenges: 1) by reconsidering the idea of moral agency and 2) by rethinking

the concept of moral responsibility itself.

1. Challenges to moral responsibility

1.1 Causal contribution

1.2 Considering the consequences

1.3 Free to act

2. Can computers be moral agents?

2.1 Computers as morally responsible agents

2.2 Creating autonomous moral agents

2.3 Expanding the concept of moral agency

3. Rethinking the concept of moral responsibility

3.1 Assigning responsibility

3.2 Responsibility as practice

4. Conclusion

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✖ Makta Pond 1 hour ago

1.2 Considering the consequences

As computer technologies shape how people perceive and experience the world, they affect the second condition for attributing moral responsibility. In order to make appropriate decisions a person has to be able to consider and deliberate about the consequences of her actions. She has be aware of the possible risks or harms that her actions might cause. It is unfair to hold someone responsible for something if they could not have known that their actions might lead to harm.

On the one hand computer technologies can help users to think through what their actions or choices may lead to. They help the user to capture, store, organize and analyze data and information (Zuboff 1982). For example, one

often-named advantage of remote-controlled robots used by the armed forces or rescue workers is that they enable their operators to acquire information that would not be able available without them. They allow their operators to look "beyond the next hill" or "around the next corner" and they can thus help operators to reflect on what the consequences of particular tactical decisions might be (US Department of Defense 2009). Similarly, data analysis tools can find patterns in large volumes of data that human data analysts cannot manually process (Boyd and Crawford 2012).

On the other hand the use of computers can constrain the ability of users to understand or consider the outcomes of their actions. These complex technologies, which are never fully free from errors, increasingly hide the automated processes behind the interface (Van den Hoven 2002). An example that illustrates how computer technologies can limit understanding of the outcomes are the controversial risk assessment tools used by judges in several states in the U.S. for parole decisions and sentencing. In 2016 a civil society organization found, based on an analysis of the risk scores of 7000 defendants produced by one particular

algorithm, that the scores poorly reflected the actual recidivism rate and seemed to have a racial bias (Angwin et al. 2016). Regardless of whether its findings were correct, what is particularly relevant here is that the investigation also showed that judges did not have a full understanding of how the probabilities were calculated, because the algorithm was proprietary. The judges were basing their sentencing on the suggestion of an algorithm that they did not fully understand. This is the case for most computer technologies today. Users only see part of the many computations that a computer performs and are for the most part unaware of how it performs them; they usually only have a partial understanding of the assumptions, models and theories on which the information on their computer screen is based.

The opacity of many computer systems can get in the way of assessing the validity and relevance of the information and can prevent a user from making appropriate decisions. People have a tendency to either rely too much or not enough on the accuracy automated systems (Cummings 2004; Parasuraman & Riley 1997). A person's ability to act responsibly, for example, can suffer when she distrust the

automation as result of a high rate of false alarms. In the Therac 25 case, one of the machine's operators testified that she had become used to the many cryptic error messages the machine gave and most did not involve patient safety (Leveson and Turner 1993, p.24). She tended ignore them and therefore failed to notice when the machine was set to overdose a patient. Too much reliance on automated systems can have equally disastrous consequences. In 1988 the missile cruiser U.S.S. Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian jet airliner, killing all 290 passengers onboard, after it mistakenly identified the airliner as an attacking military aircraft (Gray 1997). The cruiser was equipped with an Aegis defensive system that could automatically track and target incoming missiles and enemy aircrafts. Analyses of the events leading up to incident showed that overconfidence in the abilities of the Aegis system prevented others from intervening when they could have. Two other warships nearby had correctly identified the aircraft as civilian. Yet, they did not dispute the Vincennes' identification of the aircraft as a military aircraft. In a later explanation Lt. Richard Thomas of one of the nearby ships stated, "We called her Robocruiser... she always seemed to have a picture... She always seemed to be

telling everybody to get on or off the link as though her picture was better" (as quoted in Gray 1997, p. 34). The captains of both ships thought that the sophisticated Aegis system provided the crew of Vincennes with information they did not have.

Considering the possible consequences of one's actions is further complicated as computer technologies make it possible for humans to do things that they could not do before. Several decades ago, the philosopher Ladd pointed out, "[C]omputer technology has created new modes of conduct and new social institutions, new vices and new virtues, new ways of helping and new ways of abusing other people" (Ladd 1989, p. 210–11). Computer technologies of today have had a similar effect. The social or legal conventions that govern what we can do with these technologies take some time to emerge and the initial absence of these conventions contributes to confusion about responsibilities (Taddeo and Floridi 2015). For example, the ability for users to upload and share text, videos and images publicly on the Internet raises a whole set of questions about who is responsible for the content of the uploaded material. Such questions were at the heart of

the debate about the conviction of three Google executives in Italy for a violation of the data protection act (Sartor and Viola de Azevedo Cunha 2010). The case concerned a video on YouTube of four students assaulting a disabled person. In response to a request by the Italian Postal Police, Google, as owner of YouTube, took the video down two months after the students uploaded it. The judge, nonetheless, ruled that Google was criminally liable for processing the video without taking adequate precautionary measures to avoid privacy violations. The judge also held Google liable for failing to adequately inform the students, who uploaded the videos, of their data protection obligations (p. 367). In the ensuing debate about the verdict, those critical of the ruling insisted that it threatened the freedom of expression on the Internet and it sets a dangerous precedent that can be used by authoritarian regimes to justify web censorship (see also Singel 2010). Moreover, they claimed that platform providers could not be held responsible for the actions of their users, as they could not realistically approve every upload and it was not their job to censure. Yet, others instead argued that it would be immoral for Google to be exempt from liability for the damage that others suffered due to Google's profitable

commercial activity. Cases like this one show that in the confusion about the possibilities and limitations of new technologies it can be difficult to determine one's moral obligations to others.

The lack of experience with new technological innovations can also affect what counts as negligent use of the technology. In order to operate a new computer system, users typically have to go through a process of training and familiarization with the system. It requires skill and experience to understand and imagine how the system will behave (Coeckelbergh and Wackers 2007). Friedman describes the case of a programmer who invented and was experimenting with a 'computer worm', a piece of code that can replicate itself. At the time this was a relatively new computational entity (1990). The programmer released the worm on the Internet, but the experiment quickly got out of the control when the code replicated much faster than he had expected (see also Denning 1989). Today we would not find this a satisfactory excuse, familiar as we have become with computer worms and viruses. However, Friedman poses the question of whether the programmer really acted in a negligent way if the consequences were truly

unanticipated. Does the computer community's lack of experience with a particular type of computational entity influence what we judge to be negligent behavior?

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Makta Pond 1 hour ago

1.3 Free to act

The freedom to act is probably the most important condition for attributing moral responsibility and also one of the most contested. We tend to excuse people from moral blame if they had no other choice but to act in the way that they did. We typically do not hold people responsible if they were coerced or forced to take particular actions. In moral philosophy, the freedom to act can also mean that a person has free will or autonomy (Fisher 1999). Someone can be held morally responsible because she acts on the basis of her own authentic thoughts and motivations and has the capacity to control her behavior (Johnson 2001). Note that this conception of autonomy is differs from the way the term 'autonomy' is often used in computer science, where it tends to refer to the ability of a robot or computer system to independently

perform complex tasks in unpredictable environments for extended periods of time (Noorman 2009).

Nevertheless, there is little consensus on what capacities human beings have, that other entities do not have, which enables them to act freely (see the entries on free will, autonomy in moral and political philosophy, personal autonomy and compatibilism). Does it require rationality, emotion, intentionality or cognition? Indeed, one important debate in moral philosophy centers on the question of whether human beings really have autonomy or free will? And, if not, can moral responsibility still be attributed (Eshleman 2016)?

In practice, attributing autonomy or free will to humans on the basis of the fulfillment of a set of conditions turns out to be a less than straightforward endeavor. We attribute autonomy to persons in degrees. An adult is generally considered to be more autonomous than a child. As individuals in a society our autonomy is thought to vary because we are manipulated, controlled or influenced by forces outside of ourselves, such as by our parents or through peer pressure. Moreover, internal physical or

psychological influences, such as addictions or mental problems, are perceived as further constraining the autonomy of a person.

Computing, like other technologies, adds an additional layer of complexity to determining whether someone is free to act, as it affects the choices that humans have and how they make them. One of the biggest application areas of computing is the automation of decision-making processes and control. Automation can help to centralize and increase control over multiple processes for those in charge, while it limits the discretionary power of human operators on the lower-end of the decision-making chain. An example is provided by the automation of decision-making in public administration (Bovens and Zouridis 2002). Large public sector organizations have over the last few decades progressively standardized and formalized their production processes. The process of issuing decisions about student loans, speeding tickets or tax returns is carried out almost entirely by computer systems. This has reduced the scope of the administrative discretion that many officials, such as tax inspectors, welfare workers, and policy officers, have in deciding how to apply formal policy rules in individual

cases. Citizens no longer interact with officials that have significant responsibility in applying their knowledge of the rules and regulations to decide what is appropriate (e.g., would it be better to let someone off with a warning or is a speeding ticket required?). Rather, decisions are pre-programmed in the algorithms that apply the same measures and rules regardless of the person or the context (e.g., a speeding camera does not care about the context). Responsibility for decisions made, in these cases, has moved from 'street-level bureaucrats' to the 'system-level bureaucrats', such as managers and computer experts, that decide on how to convert policy and legal frameworks into algorithms and decision-trees.

The automation of bureaucratic processes illustrates that some computer technologies are intentionally designed to limit the discretion of some human beings. Indeed the field of Persuasive Technology explicitly aims to develop technological artifacts that persuade humans to perform in 'desirable' ways (IJsselsteijn et al. 2006). An example is the anti-alcohol lock that is already in use in a number of countries, including the USA, Canada, Sweden and the UK. It requires the driver to pass a breathing test before she can

start the car. This technology forces a particular kind of action and leaves the driver with hardly any choice. Other technologies might have a more subtle way of steering behavior, by either persuading or seducing users (Verbeek 2006). For example, the onboard computer devices in some cars that show, in real-time, information about fuel consumption can encourage the driver to optimize fuel efficiency. Such technologies are designed with the explicit aim of making humans behave responsibly by limiting their options or persuading them to choose in a certain way.

Verbeek notes that critics of the idea of intentionally developing technology to enforce morally desirable behavior have argued that it jettisons the democratic principles of our society and threatens human dignity. They argue that it deprives humans of their ability and rights to make deliberate decisions and to act voluntarily. In addition, critics have claimed that if humans are not acting freely, their actions cannot be considered moral. These objections can be countered, as Verbeek argues, by pointing to the rules, norms, regulations and a host of technological artifacts that already set conditions for actions that humans are able or allowed to perform. Moreover, he notes,

technological artifacts, as active mediators, affect the actions and experiences of humans, but they do not determine them. Some people have creatively circumvented the strict morality of the alcohol lock by having an air pump in the car (Vidal 2004). Nevertheless, these critiques underline the issues at stake in automating decision-making processes: computing can set constraints on the freedom a person has to act and thus affects the extent to which she can be held morally responsible.

The challenges that computer technologies present with regard to the conditions for ascribing responsibility indicate the limitations of conventional ethical frameworks in dealing with the question of moral responsibility. Traditional models of moral responsibility seem to be developed for the kinds of actions performed by an individual that have directly visible consequences (Waelbers 2009). However, in today's society attributions of responsibility to an individual or a group of individuals are intertwined with the artifacts with which they interact as well as with intentions and actions of other human agents that these artifacts mediate. Acting with computer technologies may require a different

kind of analysis of who can be held responsible and what it means to be morally responsible.

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Makta Pond 1 hour ago

2. Can computers be moral agents?

Moral responsibility is generally attributed to moral agents and, at least in Western philosophical traditions, moral agency has been a concept exclusively reserved for human beings (Johnson 2001; Doorn and van de Poel 2012). Unlike animals or natural disasters, human beings in these traditions can be the originators of morally significant actions, as they can freely choose to act in one way rather than another way and deliberate about the consequences of this choice. And, although some people are inclined to anthropomorphize computers and treat them as if they were moral agents (Reeves and Nass 1996; Nass and Moon 2000; Rosenthal-von der Pütten 2013), most philosophers agree that current computer technologies should not be called moral agents, if that would mean that they could be held morally responsible. However, the limitations of traditional ethical vocabularies in thinking about the moral

dimensions of computing have led some authors to rethink the concept of moral agency.

2.1 Computers as morally responsible agents

The increasing complexity of computer technology and the advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), challenge the idea that human beings are the only entities to which moral responsibility can or should be ascribed (Bechtel 1985; Kroes and Verbeek 2014). Dennett, for example, suggests that holding a computer morally responsible is possible if it concerned a higher-order intentional computer system (1997). An intentional system, according to him, is one that can be predicted and explained by attributing beliefs and desires to it, as well as rationality. In other words, its behavior can be described by assuming the systems has mental states and that it acts according what it thinks it ought to do, given its beliefs and desires. Many computers today, according to Dennett, are already intentional systems, but they lack the higher-order ability to reflect on and reason about their mental states. They do not have beliefs about their beliefs or thoughts about desires. Dennett suggests that the fictional HAL 9000 that featured in the movie 2001: A Space Odyssey would qualify as a

higher-order intentional system that can be held morally responsible. Although current advances in AI might not lead to HAL, he does see the development of computers systems with higher-order intentionality as a real possibility.

Sullins argues in line with Dennett that moral agency is not restricted to human beings (2006). He proposes that computers systems or, more specifically, robots are moral agents when they have a significant level of autonomy and they can be regarded at an appropriate level of abstraction as exhibiting intentional behavior. A robot, according to Sullins, would be significantly autonomous if it was not under the direct control of other agents in performing its tasks. Note that Sullins interprets autonomy in a narrow sense in comparison to the conception of autonomy in moral philosophy as property of human beings. He adds as a third condition that a robot also has to be in a position of responsibility to be a moral agent. That is, the robot performs some social role that carries with it some responsibilities and in performing this role the robot appears to have 'beliefs' about and an understanding of its duties towards other moral agents (p. 28). To illustrate what kind of capabilities are required for "full moral agency", he

draws an analogy with a human nurse. He argues that if a robot was autonomous enough to carry out the same duties as a human nurse and had an understanding of its role and responsibilities in the health care systems, then it would be a "full moral agent". Sullins maintains that it will be some time before machines with these kinds of capabilities will be available, but "even the modest robots of today can be seen to be moral agents of a sort under certain, but not all, levels of abstraction and are deserving of moral consideration" (p. 29).

Echoing objections to the early project of (strong) AI (Sack 1997),[3] critics of analyses such as presented by Dennett and Sullins, have objected to the idea that computer technologies can have capacities that make human beings moral agents, such as mental states, intentionality, common sense or emotion (Johnson 2006; Kuflik 1999). They, for instance, point out that it makes no sense to treat computer system as moral agents that can be held responsible, for they cannot suffer and thus cannot be punished (Sparrow 2007; Asaro 2011). Or they argue, as Stahl does, that computers are not capable of moral reasoning, because they do not have the capacity to understand the meaning of

the information that they process (2006). In order to comprehend the meaning of moral statements an agent has to be part of the form of life in which the statement is meaningful; it has to be able to take part in moral discourses. Similar to the debates about AI, critics continue to draw a distinction between humans and computers by noting various capacities that computers do not, and cannot, have that would justify the attribution of moral agency.

2.2 Creating autonomous moral agents

In the absence of any definitive arguments for or against the possibility of future computer systems being morally responsible, researchers within the field of machine ethics aim to further develop the discussion by focusing instead on creating computer system that can behave as if they are moral agents (Moor 2006). Research within this field has been concerned with the design and development of computer systems that can independently determine what the right thing to do would be in a given situation. According to Allen and Wallach, such autonomous moral agents (AMAs) would have to be capable of reasoning about the moral and social significance of their behavior and use their

assessment of the effects their behavior has on sentient beings to make appropriate choices (2012; see also Wallach and Allen 2009 and Allen et al. 2000). Such abilities are needed, they argue, because computers are becoming more and more complex and capable of operating without direct human control in different contexts and environments. Progressively autonomous technologies already in development, such as military robots, driverless cars or trains and service robots in the home and for healthcare, will be involved in moral situations that directly affect the safety and well-being of humans. An autonomous bomb disposal robot might in the future be faced with the decision which bomb it should defuse first, in order to minimize casualties. Similarly, a moral decision that a driverless car might have to make is whether to break for a crossing dog or avoid the risk of causing injury to the driver behind him. Such decisions require judgment. Currently operators make such moral decisions, or the decision is already inscribed in the design of the computer system. Machine ethics, Wallach and Allen argue, goes one step beyond making engineers aware of the values they build into the design of their products, as it seeks to build ethical decision-making into the machines.

To further specify what it means for computers to make ethical decisions or to put 'ethics in the machine', Moor distinguishes between three different kinds of ethical agents: implicit ethical agents, explicit ethical agents, and full ethical agents (2006). The first kind of agent is a computer that has the ethics of its developers inscribed in their design. These agents are constructed to adhere to the norms and values of the contexts in which they are developed or will be used. Thus, ATM tellers are designed to have a high level of security to prevent unauthorized people from drawing money from accounts. An explicit ethical agent is a computer that can 'do ethics'. In other words, it can on the basis of an ethical model determine what would be the right thing to do, given certain inputs. The ethical model can be based on traditional ethical theories, such as Kantian or utilitarian ethics—depending on the preferences of its creators. These agents would 'make ethical decisions' on behalf of its human users (and developers). Such agents are akin to the autonomous moral agents described by Allen and Wallach. Finally, Moor defines full ethical agents as entities that can make ethical judgments and can justify them, much like human beings can. He claims that although

there are no computer technologies today that can be called fully ethical, it is an empirical question whether or not it would be possible in the future.

The effort to build AMAs raises the question of how this effort affects the ascription of moral responsibility. If these technologies are not moral agents like human beings are, can they be held morally responsible? As human beings would design these artificial agents to behave within pre-specified formalized ethical frameworks, it is likely that responsibility will still be ascribed to these human actors and those that deploy these technologies. However, as Allen and Wallach acknowledge, the danger of exclusively focusing on equipping robots with moral decision-making abilities, rather than also looking at the sociotechnical systems in which these robots are embedded, is that it may cause further confusion about the distribution of responsibility (2012). Robots with moral decision-making capabilities may present similar challenges to ascribing responsibility as other technologies, when they introduce new complexities that further obfuscate causal connections that lead back to their creators and users. Show less

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✖ **Makta Pond 1 hour ago**

2.3 Expanding the concept of moral agency

The prospect of increasingly autonomous and intelligent computer technologies and the growing difficulty of finding responsible human agents lead Floridi and Sanders to take a different approach (2004). They propose to extend the class of moral agents to include artificial agents, while disconnecting moral agency and moral accountability from the notion of moral responsibility. They contend that "the insurmountable difficulties for the traditional and now rather outdated view that a human can be found accountable for certain kinds of software and even hardware" demands a different approach (p. 372). Instead, they suggest that artificial agents should be acknowledged as moral agents that can be held accountable, but not responsible. To illustrate they draw a comparison between artificial agents and dogs as sources of moral actions. Dogs can be the cause of a morally charged action, like damaging property or helping to save a person's life, as in the case of search-and-rescue dogs. We can identify them as moral agents even though we generally do not hold them morally

responsible, according to Floridi and Sanders: they are the source of a moral action and can be held morally accountable by correcting or punishing them.

Just like animals, Floridi and Sanders argue, artificial agents can be seen as sources of moral actions and thus can be held morally accountable when they can be conceived of as behaving like a moral agent from an appropriate level of abstraction. The notion of levels of abstraction refers to the stance one adopts towards and entity to predict and explain its behavior. At a low level of abstraction we would explain the behavior of a system in terms of its mechanical or biological processes. At a higher level of abstraction it can help to describe the behavior of a system in terms of beliefs, desires and thoughts. If at a high enough level a computational system can effectively be described as being interactive, autonomous and adaptive, then it can be held accountable according to Floridi and Sanders (p. 352). It, thus, does not require personhood or free will for an agent to be morally accountable; rather the agent has to act as if it had intentions and was able to make choices.

The advantage of disconnecting accountability from responsibility, according to Floridi and Sanders, is that it places the focus on moral agenthood, accountability and censure, instead of on figuring out which human agents are responsible. "We are less likely to assign responsibility at any cost, forced by the necessity to identify a human moral agent. We can liberate technological development of AAs [Artificial Agents] from being bound by the standard limiting view" (p. 376). When artificial agents 'behave badly' they can be dealt with directly, when their autonomous behavior and complexity makes it too difficult to distribute responsibility among human agents. Immoral agents can be modified or deleted. It is then possible to attribute moral accountability even when moral responsibility cannot be determined.

Critics of Floridi's and Sanders' view on accountability and moral agency argue that placing the focus of analysis on computational artifacts by treating them as moral agents will draw attention away from the humans that deploy and develop them. Johnson, for instance, makes the case that computer technologies remain connected to the intentionality of their creators and users (2006). She argues

that although computational artifacts are a part of the moral world and should be recognized as entities that have moral relevance, they are not moral agents, for they are not intentional. They are not intentional, because they do not have mental states or a purpose that comes from the freedom to act. She emphasizes that although these artifacts are not intentional, they do have intentionality, but their intentionality is related to their functionality. They are human-made artifacts and their design and use reflect the intentions of designers and users. Human users, in turn, use their intentionality to interact with and through the software. In interacting with the artifacts they activate the inscribed intentions of the designers and developers. It is through human activity that computer technology is designed, developed, tested, installed, initiated and provided with input and instructions to perform specified tasks. Without this human activity, computers would do nothing. Attributing independent moral agency to computers, Johnson claims, disconnects them from the human behavior that creates, deploys and uses them. It turns the attention away from the forces that shape technological development and limits the possibility for intervention. For instance, it leaves the issue of sorting out who is responsible for dealing with

malfunctioning or immoral artificial agents or who should make amends for the harmful events they may cause. It postpones the question of who has to account for the conditions under which artificial agents are allowed to operate (Noorman 2009).

Yet, to say that technologies are not moral agents is not to say that they are not part of moral action. Several philosophers have stressed that moral responsibility cannot be properly understood without recognizing the active role of technology in shaping human action (Jonas 1984; Verbeek 2006; Johnson and Powers 2005; Waelbers 2009). Johnson, for instance, claims that although computers are not moral agents, the artifact designer, the artifact, and the artifact user should all be the focus of moral evaluation as they are all at work in an action (Johnson 2006). Humans create these artifacts and inscribe in them their particular values and intentions to achieve particular effects in the world and in turn these technological artifacts influence what human beings can and cannot do and affect how they perceive and interpret the world.

Similarly, Verbeek maintains that technological artifacts

alone do not have moral agency, but moral agency is hardly ever 'purely' human. Moral agency generally involves a mediating artifact that shapes human behavior, often in way not anticipated by the designer (2008). Moral decisions and actions are co-shaped by technological artifacts. He suggests that in all forms of human action there are three forms of agency at work: 1) the agency of the human performing the action; 2) the agency of the designer who helped shaped the mediating role of the artifacts and 3) the artifact mediating human action. The agency of artifacts is inextricably linked to the agency of its designers and users, but it cannot be reduced to either of them. For him, then, a subject that acts or makes moral decisions is a composite of human and technological components. Moral agency is not merely located in a human being, but in a complex blend of humans and technologies.

In later papers, Floridi explores the concept of distributed moral actions (2013, 2016). He argues that some moral significant outcomes cannot be reduced to the moral significant actions of some individuals. Morally neutral actions of several individuals can still result in morally significant events. Individuals might not have intended to

cause harm, but nevertheless their combined actions may still result in moral harm to someone or something. In order to deal with the problem of subsequently assigning moral responsibility for such distributed moral actions, he argues that the focus of analysis should shift from the agents to the patients of moral actions. A moral action can then be evaluated in terms of the harm to the patient, regardless of the intentions of the agents involved. Assigning responsibility then focuses on whether or not an agent is causally accountable for the outcome and on adjusting their behavior to prevent harm. If the agents causally accountable - be they artificial or biological - are autonomous, can interact with each other and their environments and can learn from their interactions they can be held responsible for distributed moral actions, according to Floridi (2016).

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Makta Pond 5 days ago (edited)

So none of my content is worth anything --- placed removed from the view of the public.

⋮

That would be a violation of my first amendment rights.

Because I am challenging you all to become professional in what you do. I have placed the means and the methods to argue such a debate in a court process to which I will call into question a hidden agenda. That agenda is plain and see and I can map it out in all truth - a flowchart of the discourse of how CONFLICT AVOIDANCE is being weighed into this mix.

It is not hard to realize. The first element is the argument of long-standing internet conflict between people who experience gangstalking and those who are in their agenda to discredit it. My basis is that the community is enabling and supporting those who are among us in the hate culture by dismissing this phenomenon as a delusional mass hysteria.

The condition that starts this within my life to identify what is happening, created the internet domain registration of:

[HTTP://fuckeduphuman.net -- on June 10th, 2005] along with its the polar opposite [HTTP://realuphuman.net]

That was when I was identifying a pattern that I found disturbing -- a maladjusted culture that was occurring within the persons I was networking with within the gay communities and very specific HIV Communities in Oakland CA. I created a GOOGLE GROUP that continues to hold the documentation alongside my very own held content at my internet domains.

Just google my name [James Martin Driskill] --- and whoopsie daisy -- there is that forum -- as scattered as it is --- because I was under an assault in a long term period of cyber-bullying, cyber-stalking, and indeed cyber-hacking [a federal law offense that is placed into our world in 1996 - The Great vice president GORE's work during the Clinton Administration].

It would not be later after 2005 that the laws changed to make cyber-bullying illegal. As such, I only had the hacking event which is established

into the record in Google Groups, to head to the FBI on the date of June 21st 2006. I double down and triple down, you are removing and the

visibility of these comments to the public [against my first amendment rights] to justify yourself to hold a big fat big biggest fat "life lie" that was

coined --- a #MassiveMischeiviousMarvelofMolding Muck and I had even for a time held the internet domains space [

HTTP://MassiveMischeiviousMarvelofMolding Muck.net]

I have used collectively my internet domains I hold to my best ability to document the TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH, and NOTHING BUT THE

TRUTH -- once again to my best ability to see that absolute truth is not the scale to which is documented but in an overall impression to what is

there, the truth here documented is at a 85% more true to a 15% possible false. I could be wrong. But I don't think you will be able to persuade a

jury at this stage.

The difficultly I have into bringing forward a "CIVIL SOCIETY" discussion on this matter --- freely --- finally -- when the document is published at

the National Institutes of Health [NIH.GOV] of healthcare-related documentation of [science] researched findings, you all crash and burn to

accept this reality.

Moreover, this is just speculation -- I have no proof in this statement. But I find it rather strange, that the conflict that once again was placed into

the voids of disorderly service within my HIV Healthcare between myself and Doctor Shigeno at Borregohealth in March of 2019, manifesting to

him breaking my [standards of provider care] rights for him to justify his diverse of my care. Against the American Medical Association Journal

of Ethics that Doctors have the fiduciary [legal standing] responsibility to repair difficult physician/patient relationships, which he failed.

Open and look at the subject and content that my agenda is put into reference on the NPINO site --- it is obvious what I am doing ou here --- and

you will not - can not - hold yourself to the truth. There is something fishing going on here. I am not going to try to deny such a state of affairs - it

is self-evident --- neither should you -- the admin of this post holding against being placed into the public view -- you are all insane!

http://doctor-eric-tomomi-shigeno.fuckeduphuman.net/vitals.com-reviews/

https://disqus.com/by/jamesmartindriskill/

He continued on a course that put him and I into court on his very flimsy argument to justify that he somehow was in fear of me, that I somehow

was threatening, and somehow I was dangerous to him [in this regard of physical violence - preposterous to conclude] the placement of a

restraining order against me.

By way, I was able to file in my defense -- both sides of this are filed -- the statements that conclude the flimsy bar of reactivity here in my words is

absolutely "fucked up human" insane on the doctor's standing.

All through this time period, I am REFUSING TO CONNECT to THIS SYSTEM that does not allow me to have and MAINTAIN an OPEN and

HONEST relationship with my doctors involved in my healthcare. They hold and maintain a CONFLICT AVOIDANCE stance to have this open

discussion with me.

Doctor Shigeno was refilling my medications. This from March 2019 forward.... [go figure you attempt to cover-up that realism]

Doctor Shigeno died on April 10th 2020. This is not funny speaking. The outcome to which is really extremely sad on the dimension of your

side of this conflict cannot get their head out of their asses and be decent and professional.

I had in the past 10 days prior intentionally violated the restraining order against me in this TRAVEJESTY of JUSTICE in order to cover this big "life

lie" that you all have special interest to not bring forward.

I wonder how strong this statement rings true -- The release and publication of the NIH.GOV documentation of #Gangstalking on April 6th 2020,

the fact I had just place my own self again in legal jeopardy to fight the truth with truth, I did not yet know about this document released. But if

Doctor Shigeno had become aware of it, the pressures in all of this.

Did Doctor Eric Tomomi Shigeno Commit Suicide in view of all of this CONSPIRACY REVEALING ITSELF -- UNRAVELING ITSELF --- Boy oh Boy

oh Boy -- what kind of "Life Lie" you hold here deserves me to have to informational society -- social media wide -- tag it out --

#HIVUNTREATABLE -- You would rather kill me in this that to release some kind of authority you have been abusing for years.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7178134/

Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2020 Apr; 17(7): 2506.

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PMCID: PMC7178134

PMID: 32268595

The Phenomenology of Group Stalking ('Gang-Stalking'): A Content Analysis of Subjective Experiences

Lorraine Sheridan,1,* David V. James,2 and Jayden Roth1

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=muY1QRAntlQ

Conflict Avoidance and Associated Problems

3,760 views•Jul 23, 2018

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